

## 康哲药业 [867.HK]

平均售价受压+商业模式的前景备受关注；评级下调至持有

在康哲药业股价大幅调整后，我们与公司进行了讨论。我们认为其主要产品--Deanxit和Plendil--将受到GPO（联合带量采购）的影响。尽管这两种药物（占公司总收入约43%）并未直接列入第一轮GPO清单，但预计它们将在完成一致性评估后加入价格战。除平均售价面对风险外，我们认为此CSO（合同销售组织）的关注点是GPO对其业务模式价值的影响。简单来说，GPO下的保量模式将损害CSO的价值，因为CSO的核心价值在于通过学术推广和营销来提高药物销量。因此，除了Deanxit和Plendil有机会出现降价外，其CSO业务模式还存在系统性降级风险。虽然现在很难量化负面影响，但我们作出了一个情景分析来估计影响（图1和图2）。在各种情况下，2019年经营利润可能会下调2%-14%。我们暂时维持盈利预测，但为了反映潜在的风险，我们给予康哲药业较低的目标市盈率。我们将目标价由17.5港元（16倍2019年市盈率）下调至12.1港元（11倍2019年市盈率，较其历史平均水平低2个标准差，见图3）。在最坏的情境下（即是盈利预测将下调14%），我们的新目标价相当于12.5倍的2019年市盈率。评级从买入下调至持有。我们建议投资者暂时避开康哲药业，直到相关政策更清晰为止。

### 投资亮点

**情景分析：** 我们进行了情景分析，以估计在以下情况中政策对公司2019年盈利的潜在影响：

1) 公司接受降价以取得较确定的销量；2) 不接受降价并牺牲销量。我们的分析结果对以下假设较为敏感：1) 上游制造商通过较低的出厂价格共享多少平均售价压力；2) 节省了多少百分比的销售费用。我们估计公司的销售费用约50%与Deanxit和Plendil（D + P）有关。此外，销售费用的节省取决于受GPO影响的区域（11个城市，后来扩展到全国范围）；3) 销售成本的变化是Deanxit和Plendil销售量和出厂价格变化的函数；4) 调整计算以避免双发票系统编号引起的失真。

我们的分析结果表明如下：

- ◆ 乐观情况：当D + P销量增加>30%，以及上游制造商将出厂价格降低20%，再加上销售费用节省20%，则平均售价下降40%所带来的影响可以大致抵消。
- ◆ 最坏情况：如果公司不接受降价并牺牲销量，2019年的营业利润预测可能会下调约14%（图2案例2）。
- ◆ 公司的最佳策略是接受降价，否则在全国范围内执行GPO的两年内，公司的收益可能会受到约14%的影响，这比情景1中最悲观的情况更糟（降价幅度40%，销量升幅10%）。在降价的情况下，至少存在谈判的空间，因为其上游制造商可能分担降价的压力。

截至12月底止年度	2016A	2017A	2018E	2019E	2020E
收入（百万元人民币）	4,901	5,349	6,275	7,295	8,364
净利润(百万元人民币)	1,376	1,675	2,079	2,415	2,732
核心净利润（百万元人民币）	1,396	1,675	2,079	2,415	2,732
核心净利润率 (%)	28.5	31.3	32.9	32.9	32.5
每股核心盈利（人民币）	0.561	0.673	0.830	0.965	1.092
百分比变动	38.7	20.1	23.3	16.2	13.2
市盈率（倍）	16.6	13.8	11.2	9.7	8.5
市净率（倍）	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.3	2.0
净资产收益率 (%)	22.3	22.9	23.9	23.6	22.9
EV/EBITDA (倍)	14.6	11.2	8.7	7.2	5.9

\* 经中国银河国际证券研究部调整

来源：公司，中国银河国际证券研究部


中国医药业

持有

收盘价：10.58港元（2018年9月14日）

目标价：12.1港元 (+14.4%)

### 股价表现



市值 33.52亿美元

已发行股数 24.872亿股

核数师 Deloitte

自由流通量 49.7%

52周交易区间 10.12-19.96港元

三个月日均成交量 1,035万美元

主要股东 林刚 (43.53%)

来源：公司，彭博

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## China Medical System [867.HK]

**ASP pressure + concerns about the business model; downgrade to HOLD**

We had a discussion with China Medical System (CMS) following the sharp correction in its share price. We believe its key products—Deanxit and Plendil—will be affected by the GPO (Group Procurement Organization). Although these two drugs (~43% of CMS's total revenue) are not directly listed in the first-round GPO list, they are expected to join the ASP cut competition when they finish the consistency evaluation. Other than ASP risks, we believe the key concern for this CSO (contracted sales organization) is the impact on the value of its business model under the GPO. Simply speaking, secured volume under the GPO will damage the value of the CSO, whose core value lies in academic promotion and marketing to boost drugs volume. Therefore, in addition to a potential ASP cut for Deanxit and Plendil, its CSO business model carries systematic de-rating risks. Although it is hard to quantify the negative impact right now, we prepared a scenario analysis to estimate the impact (Figure 1&2). Under various scenarios, 2019E operating profit may be revised down by 2%-14%. We kept our earnings numbers for now, but give CMS a much lower multiple to reflect the potential risks. We lower our Target Price from HK\$17.5 (16x 2019E PER) to HK\$12.1 (11x 2019E PER, 2sd below its historical average, Figure 3). Our new Target Price implies a 2019E PER of 12.5x under the worst case scenario, i.e. downward earnings revision of 14%. Downgrade from BUY to HOLD. We suggest investors avoid CMS until there is more clarity on the policy side.

### Investment thesis

**Scenario analysis:** Our scenario analysis estimates the potential earnings impact on CMS in 2019 1) accepting an ASP cut with secured volume, and 2) not accepting an ASP cut and sacrificing secured volume. Our analysis results are sensitive to the following assumptions: 1) how much ASP pressure is shared by upstream manufacturers through lower ex-factory prices; 2) what percentage of selling expenses is saved. We estimate ~50% of CMS's selling expenses are related to *Deanxit* and *Plendil* (D+P). Also selling expense savings depend on the areas affected by the GPO (11 cities, later extended nationwide); 3) the change in the cost of goods sold is a function of the sales volume of *Deanxit* and *Plendil* and ex-factory price changes; and 4) calculations are adjusted to avoid distortion caused by the two-invoice system numbers.

Our analysis results indicate the following:

- ◆ Optimistic case: When D+P volume increase >30%, together with upstream manufacturers' lowering ex-factory prices by 20%, with 20% saving in selling expenses, the impact caused by a 40% ASP cut can be largely offset.
- ◆ Worst case: If the Company does not accept an ASP cut and sacrifices secured volume, operating profit in 2019E may be revised down by ~14% (Figure 2 case 2).
- ◆ The best strategy for CMS is to accept the ASP cut, or in about two years when the GPO is executed nationwide, CMS's earnings may be impacted by ~14%, which is even worse than the most bearish case in Scenario 1 (40% ASP cut with 10% volume increase). At least there is room for negotiation in the ASP cut case, as its upstream manufacturers may share the ASP pressure.

Y/E Dec 31	2016A	2017A	2018E	2019E	2020E
Turnover (RMB m)	4,901	5,349	6,275	7,295	8,364
Net profit (RMBm)	1,376	1,675	2,079	2,415	2,732
Core net profit (RMB m)*	1,396	1,675	2,079	2,415	2,732
Core net margin (%)	28.5	31.3	32.9	32.9	32.5
Core EPS (RMB)	0.561	0.673	0.830	0.965	1.092
% Change	38.7	20.1	23.3	16.2	13.2
PER (x)	16.6	13.8	11.2	9.7	8.5
PBR (x)	3.7	3.2	2.7	2.3	2.0
ROE (%)	22.3	22.9	23.9	23.6	22.9
EV/EBITDA (x)	14.6	11.2	8.7	7.2	5.9

\* adjusted by CGIS research

Sources: Company, CGIS Research

### China Healthcare Sector

**HOLD**

(Downgrade from BUY)

**Close: HK\$10.58 (Sep 14, 2018)**

**Target Price: HK\$12.1 (+14.4%)**

### Price Performance



Market Cap US\$3,352m

Shares Outstanding 2,487.2m

Auditor Deloitte

Free Float 49.7%

52W range HK\$10.12-19.96

3M average daily T/O US\$10.35m

Major Shareholding Lam Kong (46.04%)

Sources: Company, Bloomberg

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Figure 1: Scenario 1

**Scenario 1: Accept ASP cut with volume increase and savings in selling expenses**

**Key assumptions**

	Deanxit+ Plendil (D+P) ASP cut	Volume increase	CMS revenue impact
Case 1	-40%	10%	-14.6%
Case 2	-40%	20%	-12.0%
Case 3	-40%	30%	-9.5%
Case 4	-40%	40%	-6.9%



RMBm	2019E base case	Case 1	Case 2	Case 3	Case 4
Revenue	7,295	6,229	6,417	6,605	6,793
COGS	(3,033)	(2,531)	(2,635)	(2,739)	(2,844)
Gross profit	4,262	3,698	3,782	3,866	3,950
GPM	58.4%	59.4%	58.9%	58.5%	58.1%
Selling expenses	(1,496)	(1,196)	(1,196)	(1,196)	(1,196)
Admin expenses	(255)	(255)	(255)	(255)	(255)
Operating profit	2,576	2,246	2,330	2,414	2,498
<b>Earnings impact</b>	<b>-12.8%</b>	<b>-9.6%</b>	<b>-6.3%</b>	<b>-3.0%</b>	


1: assumes upstream manufacturers share the ASP cut, ex-factory price is lowered by 20%

2: selling expenses saving by 20% (estimated D+P selling expenses accounted for 50% of CMS total selling expenses, and ~40% can be saved under GPO)

Source: CGIS research


Figure 2: Scenario 2

**Scenario 2: Not participate in GPO (no price cut) and sacrifice volume**



Source: CGIS research

Figure 3: PE band



Source: Bloomberg

## Key financials

### Balance Sheet

As at Dec 31 (RM Bm)	2016A	2017A	2018E	2019E	2020E
Cash & cash equivalents	482	856	1,760	2,825	4,355
Inventories	509	460	646	758	874
Accounts receivable	1,682	1,487	1,820	2,079	2,384
Others	877	156	156	156	156
<b>Current assets</b>	<b>3,551</b>	<b>2,960</b>	<b>4,382</b>	<b>5,818</b>	<b>7,769</b>
Property, plant and equipment	362	479	521	559	591
Intangible assets	2,886	2,720	2,705	2,677	2,635
Others	2,993	3,978	4,015	4,057	4,056
<b>Non-current assets</b>	<b>6,241</b>	<b>7,189</b>	<b>7,253</b>	<b>7,305</b>	<b>7,294</b>
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>9,792</b>	<b>10,149</b>	<b>11,635</b>	<b>13,123</b>	<b>15,063</b>
Accounts payable	579	507	622	730	842
ST borrowings	1,612	65	216	203	213
Others	1,205	86	86	86	86
<b>Current liabilities</b>	<b>3,396</b>	<b>658</b>	<b>924</b>	<b>1,020</b>	<b>1,141</b>
Long-term debts	0	2,040	1,944	1,828	1,921
Others	128	122	126	120	146
<b>Long-term liabilities</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>2,162</b>	<b>2,070</b>	<b>1,948</b>	<b>2,066</b>
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>3,524</b>	<b>2,821</b>	<b>2,994</b>	<b>2,968</b>	<b>3,208</b>
Shareholders' equity	6,209	7,275	8,580	10,086	11,778
Minority interests	58	54	61	69	77
<b>Total equity</b>	<b>6,268</b>	<b>7,328</b>	<b>8,641</b>	<b>10,155</b>	<b>11,856</b>

### Cash Flow

Year ended Dec 31 (RM Bm)	2016A	2017A	2018E	2019E	2020E
Profit before tax	1,500	1,808	2,245	2,608	2,951
Depr & amortization	176	196	253	271	289
Change in working cap.	(511)	133	(402)	(264)	(309)
Income tax paid	(49)	(160)	(169)	(206)	(202)
Others	45	94	2	(30)	(13)
<b>Operating cash flow</b>	<b>1,162</b>	<b>2,072</b>	<b>1,928</b>	<b>2,379</b>	<b>2,716</b>
Capex	(1228)	(149)	(280)	(280)	(280)
Change in other assets	(305)	(206)	24	32	49
<b>Investment cash flow</b>	<b>(1,533)</b>	<b>(354)</b>	<b>(256)</b>	<b>(248)</b>	<b>(231)</b>
Net change in debt	1,148	493	55	(129)	103
Others	(527)	(1,838)	(822)	(937)	(1,058)
<b>Financing cash flow</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>(1,345)</b>	<b>(767)</b>	<b>(1,066)</b>	<b>(955)</b>
<b>Net change in cash</b>	<b>251</b>	<b>373</b>	<b>905</b>	<b>1,065</b>	<b>1,530</b>
Cash Beg.	229	482	856	1,760	2,825
Fx	2	1	0	0	0
Cash End.	482	856	1,760	2,825	4,355

### Profit and Loss

Year as of Dec 31 (RM Bm)	2016A	2017A	2018E	2019E	2020E
<i>Direct model</i>	4,264	4,944	5,807	6,768	7,779
<i>Agency model</i>	359	360	418	473	525
<i>Others</i>	278	45	49	54	60
<b>Revenue</b>	<b>4,901</b>	<b>5,349</b>	<b>6,275</b>	<b>7,295</b>	<b>8,364</b>
Cost of goods sold	(1989)	(1871)	(2,582)	(3,033)	(3,495)
<b>Gross profit</b>	<b>2,912</b>	<b>3,478</b>	<b>3,693</b>	<b>4,262</b>	<b>4,869</b>
Other gains / (losses)	(42)	(79)	58	65	75
Marketing expenses	(174)	(1,382)	(1,286)	(1,496)	(1,715)
Admin expenses	(222)	(222)	(220)	(255)	(293)
<b>Operating profit</b>	<b>1,474</b>	<b>1,795</b>	<b>2,245</b>	<b>2,576</b>	<b>2,936</b>
Net interest income / (expense)	(23)	(65)	(39)	(12)	14
JV, associate and others	49	78	39	44	0
Pretax income	1,500	1,808	2,245	2,608	2,951
Income taxes	(123)	(138)	(173)	(201)	(227)
Non-controlling interests	2	(5)	(8)	(8)	(8)
<b>Net profit</b>	<b>1,376</b>	<b>1,675</b>	<b>2,079</b>	<b>2,415</b>	<b>2,732</b>
Non-recurring items	(20)	(0)	0	0	0
<b>Core net profit</b>	<b>1,396</b>	<b>1,675</b>	<b>2,079</b>	<b>2,415</b>	<b>2,732</b>
EBIT	1491	1,805	2,260	2,592	2,953
EBITDA	1667	2,001	2,513	2,863	3,241
EPS (RMB)	0.553	0.673	0.830	0.965	1.092
<b>Core EPS (RMB)</b>	<b>0.561</b>	<b>0.673</b>	<b>0.830</b>	<b>0.965</b>	<b>1.092</b>
DPS (RMB)	0.222	0.269	0.332	0.386	0.437
Payout	40.1%	39.9%	40.0%	40.0%	40.0%

### Key Ratios

Year to Dec 31	2016A	2017A	2018E	2019E	2020E
<b>Growth (% YoY)</b>					
Sales	37.9	9.1	17.3	16.3	14.7
EBIT	40.5	20.7	24.3	14.8	14.0
EBITDA	46.4	19.8	24.7	14.0	13.3
Core net profit	39.9	20.1	23.3	16.2	13.2
Core EPS	38.7	20.1	23.3	16.2	13.2
<b>Profitability (%)</b>					
Gross margin	59.4	65.0	58.8	58.4	58.2
EBIT margin	30.4	33.7	35.7	35.2	35.0
EBITDA margin	34.0	37.3	39.7	38.9	38.5
Core net profit margin	28.5	31.3	32.9	32.9	32.5
ROA	14.2	16.5	17.7	18.3	18.0
ROE	22.3	22.9	23.9	23.6	22.9
<b>Balance sheet ratios</b>					
Current ratio (X)	1.0	4.5	4.7	5.7	6.8
Quick ratio (X)	0.9	3.8	4.0	5.0	6.0
Cash ratio (X)	0.1	13	19	2.8	3.8
Trade & bill receivables days	106	108	96	98	97
Trade & bill payable days	89	106	80	81	82
Inventory turnover days	82	95	78	84	85
Total debt to equity ratio (%)	26.0	0.9	2.5	2.0	1.8
Net debt / (cash) to equity (%)	18.2	(10.9)	(18.0)	(26.0)	(35.2)

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